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The virtue of low barriers to becoming
a lawyer: promoting liberal and
democratic values
RUSSELL G. PEARCE∗ & SINNA NASSERI∗∗
∗Fordham University, School of Law, New York, USA
∗∗New York, USA
ABSTRACT This article offers a new perspective on how to determine whether barriers to
practicing law are appropriate. It identifies a connection between those barriers and the
role of legal services providers (‘lawyers’) in permitting individuals to obtain their basic
political and economic rights in a liberal democracy. Democratic values require making
legal services as equally available as possible to all citizens, while liberal values dictate that
each individual has access in order to enforce human rights, compete in a market economy,
and engage in a legal system grounded in the rule of law. Liberal and democratic values
therefore require the lowest barriers to becoming a lawyer, consistent with the minimum
requirements of competence and the recognition that the level of competence required will
vary according to the type of legal services provided and the segment of the market served.
Any contrary regulatory approach requires strong empirical support to overcome the
presumption of low barriers that liberal and democratic values create. Accordingly, the
article rejects as unpersuasive arguments for high barriers based on promoting the public
good, avoiding rent-seeking, protecting consumers, advancing judicial efficiency, redressing
lawyer misconduct, and preserving lawyers’ high incomes.
1. Introduction
With regard to the question of whether a society has ‘too many lawyers?’, our concern
is not that a society has too many lawyers, but rather that it has too few. The prelimi-
nary thesis we present is relatively simple: lawyers provide vital functions in a liberal
democracy and the values of a liberal democracy require making the barriers to
becoming a lawyer as low as reasonably possible.1 We do not restrict our consideration
to those persons who today are formally denominated as lawyers. Instead, we employ
the term to refer more broadly “to occupations that require nearly full-time expertise
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and commitment to analyzing, explaining, and arguing the law, whether they are
expressly termed ‘lawyers’ or not” (Pearce & Levine, 2009, p. 1637). We use the
term ‘liberal democracy’ to describe a political system that is democratic in the
sense that the basis for governance is majority rule of equal citizens and liberal in
the sense that it seeks to promote and protect individual freedom (Pearce & Levine,
2009, p. 1637). One component of liberalism is rule of law. Although rule of law is
subject to a range of definitions, this Article “will focus in particular on the equal
application of legal rules to all members of a society, whether or not they are part
of the ruling elite” (Pearce & Levine, 2009, pp. 1636–1637). Given their commitment
to individual freedom, liberal democracies rely on market economies.
In a liberal democracy, lawyers serve as ‘civics teachers’ (Green & Pearce, 2009).
They provide necessary assistance to people in managing their personal and business
affairs, in participating in political life, and in accessing the system of justice. In doing
these things, lawyers have a particular responsibility for encouraging popular support
for liberal democratic values. While some lawyers are public officials, most provide
their services to private clients through the market. In order to promote the demo-
cratic value of equal access to knowledge and power, and the liberal values of protect-
ing human rights and rule of law (which may conflict with democratic values), as
many citizens as possible should be able to become a lawyer and as many citizens
as possible should be able to afford to retain a lawyer when needed. The best way
to achieve this goal is to permit only those barriers to law practice consistent with
the minimum standard of consumer protection. Although the precise calibration of
the appropriate barriers is beyond the scope of this article, they would provide a
floor that would permit the market to determine the number of lawyers a liberal
democracy needs, with exceptions for additional government-subsidized services for
low- and middle-income persons. The appropriate level of these subsidies is also
beyond the scope of this article, which focuses specifically on the effect of barriers
to permission to practice law absent such subsidies.
We next consider five common arguments in support of high barriers to becom-
ing a lawyer. These are: the lawyer’s commitment to the public good, the danger of
rent-seeking, the requirement of highly expert generalists to protect consumers, the
need for judicial efficiency and redress of lawyer misconduct, and the protection of
lawyers’ livelihoods. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Low barriers satisfy the
legitimate concerns that these arguments implicate. Beyond those concerns, these
arguments rely on claims that have little or no empirical support. Given the virtues
of low barriers, the burden of demonstrating the value of high barriers is on their pro-
ponents. Absent persuasive evidence for high barriers, therefore, societies should
prefer low barriers in the interest of democratic and liberal values.
In performing this analysis, we rely more heavily on US sources because we are
more familiar with them and because US commentators have traditionally focused
on a political role for lawyers beyond valuing excellence and integrity in their work
(Pearce, 2001, p. 386). Nonetheless, we do seek to consider sources outside the
United States and argue that our claims apply in general to liberal democracies. We
identify both the United States and South Africa as nations that create barriers that
undermine liberal democracy and contrast the approach in the United Kingdom,
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which appears to be on the road to developing a system of low barriers more consistent
with liberal democratic values.
2. The virtue of low barriers
Dean Roscoe Pound (1953, p. 5) described lawyers as “pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service – no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood.” This description captures how the pro-
vision of legal services has both public and private dimensions. As this section
explains, the public dimension of the delivery of legal services is connected to the exer-
cise of political and economic rights in a democracy. At the same time, in a liberal
democracy, the delivery of most legal services occurs through the market, and not
through government action. To maximize the availability of legal services – and to
best promote liberal democratic values – the barriers to providing legal services
should be as low as possible consistent with the minimum standards of consumer
protection.
The public dimension of lawyers’ work
In his 1921 and 1928 reports on legal education for the Carnegie Foundation, Alfred
Z. Reed described the importance of low barriers. He explained that becoming a
lawyer was “admission to our governing class” (Reed, 1921, p. 56). Reed observed
that:
Practicing lawyers do not merely render to the community a social service,
which the community is interested in having them render well. They are
part of the governing mechanism of the state. Their functions are in a
broad sense political. This is not due primarily to the circumstance a large
proportion of our legislative and administrative officials and virtually all of
our judges, are chosen from among this practically ruling class. . .. It
springs even more fundamentally from the fact, early discovered, that
private individuals cannot secure justice without the aid of a special pro-
fessional order to represent and to advise them. (Reed, 1921, p.3).
In identifying lawyers’ work as having a vital political dimension, Reed offered a
perspective that historically dominated the thinking of American legal ethicists. In the
United States, the first legal ethicists built
on the insights of the Framers and of leading jurists like Justice Story and
Chancellor Kent [to] posit] that lawyers, as professionals, were skilled at per-
ceiving and promoting the public good and would ensure that society
balanced the interests of individuals with the public good. (Pearce &
Wald, 2012, p. 517)
In 1854, George Sharswood, one of the fathers of American legal ethics, explained
that lawyers served both liberal and democratic goals. In democratic government,
lawyers “‘fill the highest public stations’, including dominance of the legislative
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process, and exclusive administration of the judicial system as advocates and judges”
(Pearce, 1992, p. 255). As private practitioners and community leaders, they “coun-
sel[ed] the ignorant, defend[ed] the weak and oppressed, and . . . [stood] forth on all
occasions as the bulwark of private rights against the assaults of power” (Sharswood,
1907, pp. 53–54). Whether “providing counsel to clients, [or] making arguments in
court to judge and jury” (Pearce, 1992, p. 255), lawyers “diffuse[ed] sound principles
among the people” (Sharswood, 1907, pp. 30, 54) and brought the law “home so
nearly to every man’s fireside” (pp. 30–31).
Later, when the American Bar Association (ABA) codified legal ethics, this
understanding of lawyers’ central political role continued. The ABA’s 1908 Canons
of Ethics asserted that “[t]he future of the republic, to a great extent depends upon
[lawyers’] maintenance of justice pure and unsullied”. The ABA’s 1969 Model Code
of Professional Responsibility declared that “[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a
vital role in the preservation . . . and [t]he continued existence of a free and democratic
society”. The ABA’s 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct called lawyers “public
citizen[s] having special responsibility for the quality of justice” and “play[ing] a
vital role in the preservation of society”.
Another classic exposition of this perspective is the 1958 American Bar
Association–American Association of Law Schools joint report on Professional
Responsibility, for which the famous legal philosopher Lon Fuller was the reporter.
Bruce Green and Russell Pearce (2009) have described the Report’s conception of
the lawyer’s role as a ‘civics teacher’. The Report describes
[p]rivate practice [as] a form of public service when it is conducted with
appreciation of, and a respect for, the larger framework of government of
which it forms a part, including under the term government . . . voluntary
forms of self-regulation. (ABA & Association of American Law Schools,
1958, p. 1162)
As a counselor and litigator, the lawyer maintains “the integrity of those funda-
mental processes of government and self-government upon which the successful func-
tioning of our society depends” (p. 1162).2 Indeed, “democratic and constitutional
government is tragically dependent on voluntary . . . co-operation in the maintenance
of its fundamental processes and forms” (p. 1162). In both private and public roles,
lawyers promote “voluntary cooperation” and “help shape the growth and develop-
ment of public attitudes toward fair procedures and due process”, in order to
prevent the “inevitable tendency for practice to drift downward to the level of those
. . . whose experience of life has not taught them the vital importance of preserving
just and proper forms of procedure” (p. 1216).
Perhaps the best-known inquiry into the role of lawyers in a liberal democracy has
been that of Alexis de Tocqueville. He famously struggled with the question of how
the United States could successfully maintain a liberal democracy without declining
into a tyranny of the majority. He identified the key role of lawyers and observed
that they “form the political upper class . . . of society” (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 268).
On one hand, “their interest . . . naturally pulls them toward the people” (p. 270).
Lawyers would only have such a prominent role in a democracy, and not an
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aristocracy or oligarchy where others would fill the role of the “political upper class”
(p. 268). On the other hand, lawyers would not have the same powerful role without a
commitment to the liberal values of rule of law and individual rights. Tocqueville
observes that lawyers
are the masters of a necessary and not widely understood science; they serve
as arbiters between the citizens; and the habit of directing the blind passions
of the litigants toward the objective gives them a certain scorn for the judg-
ment of the crowds. (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 264).
Tocqueville described how lawyers promoted both liberal and democratic values:
There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one. . .. As most public men are or have
been lawyers, they apply their legal habits and turn of mind to the
conduct of affairs. Juries make all classes familiar with this. So legal language
is pretty well adopted into common speech; the spirit of the law . . . infiltrates
through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole people
contracted some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate. (Tocqueville, 1840,
p. 270)
Many other commentators have identified a similar function of lawyers. The struc-
tural-functionalist (Abel, 1989, p. 15) approach of Emile Durkheim (1957) and
Talcott Parsons (1954, pp. 370, 384), for example, identified lawyers as intermedi-
aries between the people and the law, and suggested a role that is central in a
liberal democracy. Commentators in legal scholarship today continue to explore the
political dimensions of lawyers’ work from a variety of perspectives.3 Halliday et al.
(2007, p. 4), for example, have noted that lawyers have a strong history of supporting
“freedoms of the person, speech, movement, property and association”. They find
that
[h]istorical and sociological studies demonstrate the legal professions often
were active builders of the institutions of liberal politics. In a variety of
ways, legal professions sought the moderation of state power via judicial
independence, the creation and mobilisation of a politically engaged civil
society, and the vesting of rights in subjects as citizens who would be pro-
tected by judiciaries. (Halliday et al., pp. 1–2)4
Nonetheless, at the same time, other commentators ignore or minimize the political
role of lawyers. They view lawyers from a guild perspective that focuses largely on
the integrity and excellence of lawyers’ work (Pearce, 2001, p. 382, n. 5); a Marxist
perspective of lawyers as marginal to politics (Abel, 1989, p. 15); a Weberian view
of lawyers as market actors seeking a “competitive advantage within a relatively free
market” through professional organization (p. 15), or a skeptical understanding
that because lawyers pursue their own self-interest and not the public good they
have withdrawn from their political role (Pearce, 2006, p. 1339).
While a more detailed response to these commentators is beyond the scope of this
article, we hold with those commentators who find a central role for lawyers in a
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liberal democracy. We make this argument as a descriptive matter – and for purposes
of this article do not reach the debate regarding whether lawyers have an adequate
ideological commitment to the public good, or serve their own interests or those of
business clients (Pearce, 1995; Halliday & Karpik, 1997, p. 53). We agree with
Reed, Fuller, Tocqueville and others that lawyers do indeed play a significant political
role. As a result of both their expertise and their work, lawyers tend to serve in dispro-
portionate numbers as formal political leaders (Shepherd, 2003, pp. 652–654;
Halliday, 1989, p. 375; Heinz et al., 1993, pp. 127–132). They also serve as informal
leaders both in their communities and through their everyday work, in which they are
civics teachers who help shape how clients and community understand liberal
democratic values (e.g. Pearce, 2006; Green & Pearce, 2009) Accordingly, both in
their public and private capacities, lawyers in fact serve as intermediaries
between the people and the law. In this role, lawyers influence how well a liberal
democracy provides democratic participation in political and economic institutions
and protects human rights and rule of law, whether lawyers consciously seek those
goals or not.
Why lawyers’ political role requires low barriers in a liberal democracy
Given this role, liberal democratic values require that the opportunity to become a
lawyer and to obtain the services of lawyer be widely available. Democratic values
require that citizens have an equal opportunity to become a lawyer and join the pol-
itical leadership class. Democratic values also weigh in favor of providing citizens with
an equal opportunity to gain from lawyers the legal knowledge and assistance they
need to participate effectively in political and economic life. Liberal values weigh in
the same direction. Citizens need to access the legal knowledge and assistance of
lawyers to vindicate their individual rights, especially when those rights conflict
with the will of the majority. Rule of law further requires that citizens have access
to lawyers in order to obtain equal justice from the legal system, even when justice
conflicts with the will of the majority. Broad access to becoming a lawyer and to
obtaining a lawyer’s services helps disseminate liberal democratic values throughout
the population.
In applying this analysis to the qualifications for becoming a lawyer, we return to
the work of Alfred Z. Reed. First, he recognized that barriers to becoming a lawyer
should be as low as possible. He explained that “democratic ideals” necessitated
“that participation in making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible
to Lincoln’s plain people” (Pearce & Levine, 2009, p. 1655). As a result, the
“general education requisite for admission to . . . public service [as a lawyer should
not exceed] the level that can be reached by the average man” (Reed, 1921,
pp. 52–53). Second, Reed observed that the market for legal services was differen-
tiated. Accordingly, the delivery of legal services should not be subject to a unitary
legal profession (p. 60). Consumers of legal services have a range of needs and a
range of resources. This differentiated market, in Reed’s view, demanded “lawyers
of differing skills and qualifications serving different purposes and different elements
in society” (Stevens, 1983, p. 114).
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Reed’s principles accord with liberal democratic values. To make the ability to
provide or to obtain legal services as broadly available as possible, the only barrier to
legal practice should be the minimum standard of consumer protection – that the pro-
vider can provide the legal services competently and honestly.5 Although the precise cali-
bration of such minimum standards is beyond the scope of this article,6 delivery of simple
legal services might require only a few weeks or months of legal training, or it might
require allowing a lawyer to createprocedures for, and supervise, non-lawyer servicepro-
viders. More complicated services, such as representation in court, would require
mastery of court procedures, as well as some minimum amount of general legal knowl-
edge. A competitive market would provide additional protection to consumers. Efficient
markets provide consumers with the best quality services at the lowest cost. An efficient
legal services market would includeproducts, suchasprivate referral or rating services, to
help consumers evaluate the quality of lawyers (Pearce, 1995, p. 1273).
In addition, liberal democratic values would suggest that the range of acceptable
requirements could depend upon the level of education and resources in a society. In
Stevens, 1983, p. 184 n. 42, the nineteenth-century United States, for example, where
free public education through high school was not generally available (Goldin, 1999,
p. 4), lawyers representing clients in court had to satisfy only minimal standards and
did not even need a high-school education (Barton, 2011, pp. 111–113). During this
period, many distinguished lawyers, such as Abraham Lincoln and John Marshall,
lacked formal legal education, and the legal system as a whole functioned reasonably
well (Barton, 2011; Pearce & Levine 2009, pp. 1654–1660).
3. Unpersuasive defense of high barriers
Using the examples of the United States and South Africa, this section explains how
high barriers transgress liberal and democratic values. Next, it evaluates arguments
commentators have used to justify these harms and finds little support for them.
Harms of high barriers
The United States and South Africa offer examples of liberal democracies with high
barriers to becoming a lawyer. The barriers undermine both democratic and liberal
values. They make it more difficult than necessary for people to become lawyers
and skew membership in the legal profession toward those with privilege in society.
Similarly, high barriers make it more challenging for those without privilege to
obtain legal services (Barton, 2011, pp. 144–146). This deprives them of an equal
opportunity to participate in both democratic government and the market
economy, to obtain justice from the courts, and to protect their human rights. High
barriers also undermine popular commitment to liberal democratic values.
In the United States today, the barriers to becoming a lawyer include a four-year
college degree, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), three years of law school, a
bar exam, and a moral character requirement.7 The cost of the three years of law
school tuition (without even considering living costs) averages $105,000 for private
school and $60,000 for public school (Law school tuition soars, 2011). These
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requirements are the same for all lawyers, from those who prepare the simplest wills to
those who litigate the most complicated antitrust cases. Several states also allow for
the practice of ‘reading law’, in which lawyers integrate work experience in a legal
office with independent study of the law (Moeser & Huismann, 2012, pp. 8–12)
According to a 2003 estimate, only a few hundred students nationwide were pursuing
this route to the bar (McDonald, 2003). The ABA and National Conference of
Bar Examiners strongly discourage this practice, maintaining that “Neither private
study, correspondence study, law office training, age, nor experience should be
substituted for law school education” (Moeser & Huismann, 2012).
High barriers in the United States lead to two key types of harms. First, they
restrict the type of people who become lawyers (Winston et al., 2011, p. 82). In the
legal profession, persons with privilege are over-represented and those who are less
privileged are under-represented. For instance, racial minorities made up more
than one-third of the United States population in 2010 (Hixson et al., 2011, p. 2),
but only 11.6% of lawyers (Chambliss, 2011, p. 10).8 And the American legal edu-
cation system skews the same way: racial minorities9 and low-income people10 are
under-represented among law students. For example, a UCLA Law School study
found that “of people in their twenties, those from families with incomes over
$200,000 were about fifty times more likely to end up as students at [the] law
school than were those from families below the poverty line” (Sander, 1997, p. 475).
Second, high barriers restrict the type of people who are able to purchase legal
services. According to Deborah Rhode (2004, p. 5), “about four-fifths of the civil
legal needs of the poor, and two-to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individ-
uals, remain unmet”. Further, “[o]nly one lawyer is available to serve approximately
9,000 low-income persons, compared with one for every 240 middle- and upper-
income Americans” (Rhode, 2003, pp. 47–48).
South Africa has similar high barriers and similar harms. In South Africa, the bar-
riers include a college degree, brief practical training, and an apprenticeship (Pearce &
Levine, 2009, p. 1650). Though seemingly less restrictive than the barriers in the
United States, South African barriers constrain diversity in the legal profession and
limit the populace’s access to justice.
The white minority dominates the legal profession in South Africa. Although
blacks, coloreds, and Asians are 90.6% of the population, they represent only 25%
of lawyers (Pearce & Levine, 2009, p. 1650). The high barriers to entry cause this dis-
parity for many reasons. Although blacks are approximately 50% of current law stu-
dents (p. 1652), this number is still below their percentage of the population and
indicates that equality in the legal profession is far from realization. Similarly, for
example, the requirement of an apprenticeship with a practicing attorney has “had
the practical effect of keeping non-white law graduates from obtaining admission”
because “candidate attorneys [must] find a lawyer or law firm [willing to] offer
them [a clerkship]” and “the legal profession historically has been comprised over-
whelmingly of white attorneys in a racially segregated legal system” (p. 1652, n. 67).
In addition to attorneys, South Africa provides a limited number of alternative
legal services practitioners: “approximately 350 ‘community advice centers’, and 56
‘paralegal advice offices’, some of the staff of which have completed ‘an intensive
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three month training program’, provide advice ‘at the community level’, especially ‘in
rural areas’” (Pearce and Levine, 2009, p. 1650).
Even with this additional group that falls within our definition of lawyers, South
Africa fails to meet the test of liberal and democratic values in providing legal services.
David McQuoid-Mason (2012, p. 26) estimates that as much as 70% of the popu-
lation is unable to afford a lawyer. Strikingly, for example, “about 10,000 people a
year are . . . sentenced to terms of imprisonment without being legally represented”
(McQuoid-Mason, 2012, p.7).
All these statistics illustrate how high barriers function to reinforce the privileged
position of white South Africans and to create a barrier to equality for black and
colored South Africans.
Why efforts to justify these harms are unpersuasive
In countless books and articles, commentators have sought to justify high barriers.
This article briefly considers these arguments and explains why they are unpersuasive.
The lawyer’s commitment to the public good. Some commentators argue that high bar-
riers are necessary to limit lawyers to those who will, in Roscoe Pound’s
(1953, p. 5) terms, “purs[ue their legal careers] as a common calling in the spirit of
public service”.11 Commentators have identified a range of qualifications that argu-
ably promote this spirit, including a liberal arts education (ABA, 1929, pp. 605,
621–624), a multi-year Socratic legal education (Robinson, 2011), or a required
professional responsibility course.
Undoubtedly, commitment to public service has potential benefits in a liberal
democracy. If lawyers as civics teachers view their work as a “calling in the spirit of
public service,” they are probably more likely to work to promote both democratic
and liberal values. On the other hand, the arguments for each of the proposed require-
ments are based on supposition. There is no persuasive evidence that a liberal arts
education, Socratic legal education, or professional responsibility course make it
more likely that lawyers will view their work as a “calling in the spirit of public
service” (Pound, 1953, p. 5).12
Moreover, anecdotal evidence is to the contrary. Some of the greatest members of
the US legal profession, such as Chief Justice John Marshall (Stevens, 1983, p. 11,
n. 14; Federal Judicial Center, 2012) or Abraham Lincoln (Stevens, 1983, p. 19, n. 72,
p. 25; Law school tuition soars, 2011), never completed a liberal arts education,
Socratic legal education, or a professional responsibility course.13 Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that these educational barriers have proven ineffective in inculcating ‘the
spirit of public service’. Bar leaders, for example, complain of a “crisis of professionalism”
(Pearce, 1995, p. 1263) resulting from lawyers’declining commitment to the public good.
Accordingly, there is no evidence to support arguments that high barriers
promote an ethic of public service.
Danger of rent-seeking. Some commentators worry that lawyers are “parasitic rent-
seekers” (Galanter, 1994, p. 636) who seek to manipulate law and the legal system
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to their own benefit or the benefit of their clients and who accordingly exert a negative
influence on economic growth (Magee, 2010, p. 2). They argue, for example, that
rent-seeking lawyers promote excessive lawsuits, too many laws and regulations,
and economic inefficiency (p. 3). High barriers could reduce the number of lawyers
and therefore the opportunity for rent-seeking (p. 3) or could exclude those with a
propensity for becoming rent-seekers from the pool of lawyers.
As an initial matter, the factual grounding for the claim that lawyers are rent
seekers is weak. Economists and sociologists have examined this claim at length and
the evidence is equivocal at best.14 But even assuming that lawyers are rent-seekers,
the arguments for high barriers are unpersuasive. As noted above, high barriers
have not proven effective in identifying lawyers with a greater or lesser commitment
to the public good and would therefore be unlikely to exclude lawyers who have an
inclination to rent-seeking. Similarly weak is the argument that high barriers will mini-
mize rent-seeking solely by reducing the number of lawyers (Magee, 2010, p. 3). Other
economists have argued, for example, that high barriers and the resulting oligopoly on
the provision of legal services promote rent-seeking. They suggest that high barriers
create “socially perverse incentives for attorneys in their collective behavior as an inter-
est group to support inefficient regulatory, liability, patent, and other policies that pre-
serve and enhance their wealth” (Winston et al., 2011, p. 5). Lowering barriers would
make the market for legal services more efficient by “allow[ing] a greater number of
qualified participants to spur competition in the legal services market and reduce
legal fees, creating substantial economic welfare benefits” (p. 85).
Consumer protection requires a profession of highly expert generalists. Some commentators
argue that the high barriers associated with highly expert generalists are necessary to
protect consumers. They reject the idea of differentiated legal services and a differen-
tiated legal services market. They argue that all legal problems are complex and
require the attention of an attorney who has undergone extensive training.15
Accordingly, even legal matters that appear to be relatively simple, like an uncontested
divorce, implicate countless rights and liabilities (Robinson, 2011). Only a highly
trained professional can navigate this complex web to prevent possible unintended
and profound consequences (Robinson, 2011). Commentators argue that as a
result of this complexity, the information asymmetry between lawyers and consumers
of legal services, as well as the potential for irremediable harm, require protecting con-
sumers through ex ante barriers rather than through market competition and ex post
remedies (Barton, 2011, pp. 147–150).
This argument suffers from a number of weaknesses. First, as Benjamin Barton
(2011, p. 148) observes, “[n]either information asymmetry nor irremediable harms is
present in most areas of legal practice”. Second, the limited empirical evidence that
exists does not support the claim that high barriers provide necessary consumer pro-
tection. Studies in England and Wales, for example, found that “nonlawyers provided
better legal service in civil matters such as welfare benefits, debt, housing, and
employment than solo and small-firm practitioners provided” (Winston et al.,
pp. 86–87).16 In a US study, Herbert Kritzer (1998, pp. 76, 108, 148, 190) compared
lawyers and non-lawyers in representing clients in administrative proceedings and
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found that “formal training (in the law) is less crucial than is day-to-day experi-
ence”.17 Another study in California of “people who had obtained assistance in litigat-
ing pro se, [found that] a higher percentage of those who had obtained help from
paralegals were satisfied than of those who received help from lawyers” (Selinger,
1996, pp. 879, 910).
Third, the argument for a unified legal profession of highly expert generalists
necessarily relies on the assumption that the legal services market is unitary. This
assumption is false. Consumers with different resources and needs seek different
levels of legal services in today’s market. Indeed, treating the legal services market
as undifferentiated and requiring only one level of services leaves many
individuals without any access to legal services. In a liberal democracy, legal services
are sold on the market. In the market, low- and middle-income consumers will
never be able to afford the same quality of services as wealthy individuals and
organizations.
Some commentators nevertheless prefer to treat legal services as a unitary market
because in theory low- and middle-income people would receive the same quality of
legal services as more privileged consumers.18 In reality, though, the legal services
market is not unitary. Accordingly, the choice is not between equal or inferior services
for low- and middle-income consumers. The choice is between no services in a unitary
market or affordable services in a differentiated market (Rhode 2004, p. 5, 2003,
pp. 47–48) Of course, in all markets, wealthy individuals and organizations are able
to purchase higher quality goods and services than low- and middle-income
persons. The answer is not to deny low- and middle-income persons services
altogether but to provide the greatest amount of access possible through the market
and to pursue institutional strategies to maximize the possibility of equal justice.
(Pearce, 2004). As Deborah Rhode (2004, p. 4) notes, “Equal justice may be an
implausible aspiration, but more accessible legal institutions are within our reach.”
Judicial efficiency and redress of lawyer misconduct. We group these arguments because
they are similar and have similar responses. In essence, commentators have claimed
that low barriers would permit legal services providers who do not understand pro-
cedural law to interfere with the efficient administration of justice (Mystal, 2011)
and also to provide legal services without being subject to liability for malpractice
and discipline (Elefant 2011). These objections have little merit. Requiring legal ser-
vices providers to understand procedural law before they can practice in court would
fall squarely within the minimum requirements of even a low barrier to practice. So,
too, would liability for malpractice and discipline.
Protection of lawyers’ livelihoods. Some commentators endorse high barriers and limit-
ing the number of lawyers in order to protect relatively high incomes for lawyers. They
argue that the legal market is saturated,19 and that steps should be taken to reduce the
supply of lawyers in order to protect the profession’s average wage (Greenbaum,
2010). Critics20 (See Grassley, 2011; Mystal, 2010) have singled out the ABA in par-
ticular for “continu[ing] to allow unneeded new schools to open and refus[ing] to
properly regulate the schools” (Greenbaum, 2010). They argue that the ABA
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should use its accreditation power more forcefully to restrict the amount of new law
schools and to close some existing schools.21
This argument suffers from three weaknesses. First, limiting freedom to pursue
an occupation and to purchase services freely violates the principles of liberal democ-
racy. Second, even if it did not, low – and not high – barriers would actually benefit
lawyers in the long run. Lowering barriers would likely lead to competition that would
encourage the legal services industry to innovate to include low and middle-income
consumers and potentially create more jobs.22 Lowering barriers would also reduce
the cost of legal training and therefore would similarly “make it possible for
[lawyers] to afford to work at salaries that would permit the development of new
law practices that could serve the large number of low and middle income consumers
who cannot currently afford to purchase legal services” (Pearce, 2012b). Last, while
lower barriers and increased competition would probably decrease the income of
some lawyers, lower barriers would also
benefit lawyers and people who are thinking about becoming a lawyer in
other ways. By reducing earnings premiums, deregulating entry into the
legal profession would reduce the likelihood that some individuals make a
socially and privately suboptimal career choice to become a lawyer in
pursuit of high earnings. (Winston et al., 2011, p. 90).
4. Experiments in lower barriers
As a counter to the negative examples of the United States and South Africa, we offer
the positive examples of developments in England and Wales. With a history of some-
what lower barriers and recent developments that significantly lower barriers, the
experience of England and Wales tentatively suggests that moving in the direction
of liberal democratic values can prove workable. We also draw attention to parallel
developments in Australia and increasing interest in low barriers in the United States.
First, the general requirement in the United Kingdom for being a lawyer who can
provide a wide range of services, such as a solicitor or barrister, is more in accord with
liberal and democratic values. In contrast to the United States, which requires three
years of expensive graduate education, England and Wales only require an under-
graduate degree in law (or college degree plus a year of legal training), together with
practical training and an apprenticeship (Law Society, 2012). Moreover, in England
and Wales, undergraduate education is more widely available and less expensive
than in the United States. South Africa has general requirements similar to those in
England and Wales, but its barriers are less liberal and democratic both because a
smaller percentage of the population attends college and because, as noted above,
the racial majority is significantly under-represented in legal education.23
Second, especially since the 1980s, England and Wales have made it significantly
easier for those who are not solicitors and barristers to provide legal services; i.e. to fit
within this article’s definition of a lawyer. As a historical matter, the United Kingdom,
including England and Wales, never erected the high barriers to providing transactional
representation that the United States created in the twentieth century. As a result,
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in the UK, there have been very few restrictions on offering legal advice and
assistance. Most legal services can be offered by anyone for free or for a fee.
Some important legal services are “reserved” in the sense that only author-
ised practitioners may offer them. However, the list is relatively short: con-
veyancing (real property transfer), probate, preparation for litigation,
advocacy and notary work. By contrast, the number of authorised prac-
titioners who may offer these services is relatively large and includes not
only lawyers but also, depending on the work, licensed conveyancers, legal
executives, patent agents, banks and insurance companies. (Whelan,
2009, pp. 465, 471)
Indeed, today “the single largest providers of legal advice are probably the Citizen
Advice Bureaus, which are actually staffed by lay volunteers” (Kritzer, 1999,
p. 744). Tesco, the UK analog to Wal-Mart, began to offer low-priced legal services
pertaining to “divorce, employment and business online” in 2004 (Whelan, 2009,
p. 491).24
Moreover, in an effort to promote economic liberalism,25 the trend since the
1980s has been to broaden the extent of legal services offered by those who are
neither solicitors nor barristers. In 1985, for example, the government abolished
“the solicitors’ conveyancing monopoly” (Whelan, 2009, p. 472). Predictably, as
“[l]icensed conveyancers [came to] undertake work that had yielded fifty percent of
their collective income”, the result was “[i]ncreased competition [and] lower
prices” (p. 473). Today, the liberalization continues. Following the Clementi
Report and the Legal Services Act of 2007, people who are not solicitors will be
able “to invest in and own law firms” (Flood, 2011, p. 514). Moreover, the new regu-
latory structure permits the creation of Alternative Business Structures that can
“provide any type of legal services, both reserved and unreserved, as well as other
related services such as insurance, surveying and so on[; can] raise capital by listing
on the stock exchange” and can consist of both solicitors and other service providers,
or even no solicitors at all (Whelan, 2009, pp. 481–482).
This framework better serves liberal and democratic values. Lower barriers for
becoming a legal services provider make more democratic the opportunity to
become a formal or informal political leader. By making it easier to obtain legal ser-
vices, lower barriers make more democratic the provision of legal services and the
opportunity to participate effectively in political and economic life. This was the
driving force behind the legal services reforms of the past decade in the United
Kingdom. Lord Falconer, then serving as Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs, outlined in a 2005 White Paper his ‘vision of a legal services market . . . that
is responsive, flexible, and puts the consumer first”. Since “legal services are crucial
to people’s ability to access justice”, they “must therefore be regulated and made avail-
able in such a way as to meet the needs of the public – individuals, families, and
businesses” (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2005, p. 7). Wider availability
of legal services also serves the liberal end of assisting citizens in vindicating their indi-
vidual rights and obtaining equal justice from the legal system. Last, this broad access
holds the potential to better disseminate liberal and democratic values. We do
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recognize, however, that not all commentators view these developments as wholly
positive and the long-term effects have yet to be measured.26
Australia has also loosened restrictions on the provision of legal services in light of
these concerns. In 2004, the Australian state of New South Wales passed the Legal
Profession Act (LPA), which allows legal service providers to “incorporate and
provide legal services either alone or alongside other legal service providers who
may, or may not be ‘legal practitioners’”.27 The purpose of the 2004 LPA is to
foster liberal and democratic values: it aims to regulate legal practice “in the interests
of the administration of justice and for the protection of law clients and the public gen-
erally” (LPA 2004, 1.1:3). Australia’s reforms have had a substantial impact: Slater
and Gordon, a large law firm with 20 offices nationwide, made Australian history
in 2007 by placing millions of shares of the company up for trade on the Australian
Stock Exchange.28 Early indications suggest that the quality of legal services has
not diminished (Mark, 2009; Mark & Gordon, 2009).
At the same time, the United States boasts a lively academic discourse about low-
ering barriers. McGinnis and Mangas (2012) suggest that undergraduate institutions
offer a major in law, which (combined with a year of apprenticeship after gradu-
ation29) would allow students to sit for the bar without incurring the exorbitant
costs of graduate education. They expressly argue that an undergraduate degree in
law would provide the benefits of a liberal arts education through “an interdisciplinary
education, mixing elements of social science and humanities with legal doctrine”
(p. 42). In addition to an undergraduate degree, their model would also permit
alternative JD programs. Like McGinnis and Mangas, Pearce (2012a, b) promotes
an undergraduate law degree, a one-year intensive course for those who complete a
different undergraduate degree, and a shortened JD degree rather than the current
three-year program.
Similarly, within the last two decades, many legal scholars have argued for low-
ering barriers more generally. Thomas Morgan (1977, 2010), Deborah L. Rhode
(1996) and Russell G. Pearce (1995), and more recently Larry Ribstein (2007,
2010), Gillian Hadfield (2011), Benjamin Barton (2011) and Renee Newman
Knake (2012), among others,30 have argued for significant deregulation of the legal
profession. Knake’s influential work, for example, argues that the prohibition on cor-
poration ownership of law practices both violates the United States Constitution and
impedes access to services for low- and middle-income consumers.31 Knake (2012,
p. 9) predicts a shift to permitting corporate ownership, citing the ongoing litigation
against the corporate ownership ban in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and
North Carolina. Morgan (2010), Pearce (1995), Hadfield (2011), Barton (2011)
and Ribstein (2007, 2010) argue that law firms already function as profit-seeking
businesses and accordingly deregulation will increase access to, and improve the
quality of, legal services without corrupting the legal profession.
Nonetheless, proponents of high barriers continue to have great influence. The
leadership of the American bar persists in promoting high barriers in developing
countries (Pearce & Levine, 2009) and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are
engaged in transitions to graduate legal education (McGinnis & Mangas, 2012,
pp. 26–28). We hope that the framework presented in this article offers a new way
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of evaluating such proposals in terms of their effectiveness in either promoting or
undermining liberal and democratic values.
5. Conclusion
Low barriers to becoming a lawyer, consistent with minimum standards of compe-
tence in differentiated markets for legal services, best promote liberal and democratic
values. Low barriers make it easier to become a lawyer and to purchase legal services.
In doing so, they provide more equal access to political and economic institutions, and
greater protection for human rights and the rule of law. High barriers, as in the
examples of the United States and South Africa, favor those who are already privi-
leged in society and disadvantage those who are less privileged, without demonstrably
improving the quality of legal services. Proponents of high barriers have failed to offer
persuasive evidence to the contrary.
We acknowledge that there is only very limited empirical research, if any, on basic
issues we have raised, including exactly what specific minimum standards are necess-
ary for consumer protection and the precise ways in which lower barriers promote
liberal and democratic values. In the absence of definitive research on these topics,
we conclude that the weight of liberal and democratic values favors low barriers
and requires that any defense of high barriers must satisfy the burden of persuasion.
Determining a more calibrated approach requires further research into both the
efficacy of barriers to the delivery of services and their implications for liberal and
democratic values. First, research could identify the specific training required to
resolve competently different types of legal problem, as well as to promote commitment
to ethics and the public good among legal services providers. For example, research
could prove or disprove whether an undergraduate liberal arts education is essential
to providing all types of legal services or to maintaining a commitment to ethics and
the public good. Second, research into jurisdictions that increase or decrease barriers,
or between jurisdictions with higher and lower barriers, could help illuminate the extent
to which barriers correlate with more equal access to legal or economic power. For
example, although England and Wales have historically provided less economic mobi-
lity than the United States, they have in recent years surpassed the United States
(DeParle, 2012). Economic mobility is, of course, a liberal and democratic goal.
Given the importance of lawyers to both political and economic opportunity, our
thesis would predict this result in light of the significantly lower barriers to providing
legal services in England and Wales. But whether low barriers to legal services have
indeed had a meaningful influence on this result requires further investigation.
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Notes
[1] The legitimacy of liberal and democratic values is beyond the scope of this Article. See, for example,
Pearce (2006, pp. 1358–1365).
[2] Cf. Abel (1987, p. 467), explaining that “[t]o assert a legal claim is to perform a vital civic
obligation”.
[3] See Pearce (2001, pp. 385–387, 2006, pp. 1354–1356), Pearce & Wald (2011), Green & Pearce
(2009, p. 1212), Breyer (2000, pp. 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 21–22), Simon (2000, pp. 63, 80,
118–120), Wendel (2010, pp. 89–92), Ziv (2009, pp. 1767–1770) and Luban (2009, p. 9).
[4] See also Abel (1987, p. 454), noting that “[l]itigation is an important form of political activity: courts
exercise political authority, modify substantive laws, and allocate resources”.
[5] Of course, minimal standards of consumer protection would also require methods for addressing
lawyers’ violation of ethical and legal obligations (Barton, 2011, pp. 147–151).
[6] Indeed, we note that some commentators, such as Milton Friedman, rejected any occupational
licensing requirements on the ground that they artificially increased the price and reduced the
quality of professional services (Friedman, 1962, pp. 137–160).
[7] These barriers would have been even more prohibitive earlier in the twentieth century. The percen-
tage of persons aged 25 years and over with an undergraduate or advanced degree has increased from
2.7% in 1910 to 3.9% in 1930, 7.7% in 1960, and 30.1% in 2011 (National Center for Educational
Statistics, 2011).
[8] Levin & Alkoby (2012) identify similar results in Canada.
[9] In Fall 2010, only 7.2% of law school matriculants were black (LSAC, 2010), although 12.9% of
America’s population was black (http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/matrics-by-ethnicity.
asp; Rastogi et al., 2011, p. 3). Similarly, Hispanics and Latinos made up only 6.1% of matriculants
(LSAC, 2010) while comprising 16% of the population (Ennis et al., 2011, p. 2).
[10] Sander’s (1997, p. 475) UCLA study found that for law students at the school, “the median income
of student’s parents was more than double the national median”.
[11] Consider the claim by Halliday & Karpik (1997, p. 53) that the credibility of those who seek to link
political goals and the public good may be undermined by a strong commitment to corporate
markets and the intense pursuit of material interest.
[12] See generally Barton (2005) and Winston et al. (2011, pp. 83–84: “In the case of legal services, it is
not clear that occupational licensing has measurably improved service quality because no evidence
exists to justify the ABA’s initial accreditation policies”). Wald & Pearce (2011, p. 405) argue that
“Law schools have been instilling a very specific brand of professional identity, forming students
into autonomously self-interested lawyers” who “believe that their duties to the public interest
and to public service are fulfilled by their representation of private client interests such that they
have no other responsibility to further the rule of law and access to justice.” See also Kronman
(2000, p. 32) and Hamilton & Monson (2011).
[13] Even some of the key arguments that helped persuade the ABA to adopt high barriers would be con-
sidered bigoted and unpersuasive today. In 1929, Henry Drinker, a leader in the field of legal ethics,
argued that higher barriers would ensure that only the “right kind of people” (Levine, 2005, pp. 8–9)
entered the legal profession and would exclude potential lawyers who “came up from the gutter”,
such as “Russian Jew boys” (ABA, 1929, pp. 605, 621–624).
[14] See Galanter (1994, pp. 647–656) and Cross (2005, pp. 9–10).
[15] See Mystal (2011), Robinson (2011), Elefant (2011), NY Times Editorial (2011) and Winston
(2011).
[16] See also Cantrell (2004, pp. 883, 888–891) and Moorhead (2003, pp. 784–789).
[17] See also Cantrell (2004, pp. 887–888).
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[18] For example, the ABA has opposed the use of some self-help services for consumers, professing
worry about their quality: “The stated concern is that ignorant consumers will suffer from assistance
offered by individuals who do not meet the competence and ethical standards established for
licensed attorneys.” The upshot of this resistance “is that a majority of surveyed courts lack
formal services to assist pro se litigants” (Rhode, 2004, p. 83).
[19] See, for example, Rampell (2011: “The climate is hard partly because of the weak economy, but also
partly because the nation’s law schools are churning out more lawyers than the economy needs even
in the long run”); Greenbaum (2010: “[T]housands of lawyers now find themselves drowning in the
unemployment line as the legal sector is being badly saturated with attorneys”); Lowrey (2011: “The
demand for lawyers has fallen off a cliff, both due to the short-term crisis of the recession and long-
term changes to the industry, and is only starting to rebound”); and Lat (2010: “I share the concern
that perhaps too many schools are cranking out too many debt-saddled graduates, releasing them
into an already saturated legal job market”).
[20] See Grassley (2011) and Mystal (2010).
[21] See Greenbaum (2010) and Mystal (2010).
[22] See Winston et al. (2011, p. 94), Somin (2011) and McGinnis & Mangas (2012).
[23] Notwithstanding these lower barriers, the United Kingdom continues to face challenges in providing
women and people of color with equal access to becoming a lawyer (Sommerlad et al., 2010).
[24] Although Tesco had previously “experimented over the years in offering legal services by contracting
with outside lawyers” (Knake, 2012, pp. 6, 40), the 2007 Legal Services Act allowed them to start
providing these services themselves. For a consumer-oriented comparison between various forms of
will-writing, including do-it-yourself wills and hiring a lawyer, see Legal Services Board (2011).
[25] See Whelan (2009, pp. 472–75) and Webb (2004, p. 81).
[26] For example, Avrom Sherr (1998, p. 2) writes that “deregulation . . . [and] competition within and
among the professions” are responsible for the legal profession’s “move away from the altruism of the
professional ideal towards a more open commercialism”. Moorhead (2010, p. 227). argues that
changing norms of legal practice, marked by deregulation and greater specialisation, bring negative
consequences for both lawyers and clients: “Work is de-skilled and broken up into different activities
which can be handled by lower level operatives. Many working within this new system find it easier to
begin areas of highly complex work. However, long hours and the repetitive nature of the work have
caused many young solicitors stress and worries about whether they have made the right choice of
career.” He further suggests that the new approaches result in multiple lawyers handling the
various elements of a client’s case and undercut the possibility of a sustained relationship between
lawyer and client that can inform the lawyer’s advocacy.
[27] Mark (2009, p. 47) defines legal practitioners as those with a full license to practice law. See also
Knake (2012, pp. 10, 39).
[28] See Mark (2009, p. 55), Knake (2012, p. 39) and also Grech & Morrison (2009).
[29] Interestingly, in systems that require apprenticeship, commentators have noted that such a require-
ment tends to favor those who are privileged on the basis of class, gender, race, or national origin
(Levin & Alkoby, 2012, pp. 15–16; Sommerlad et al., 2010, pp. 31–36; Sommerlad &
Stapleford, 2009).
[30] Knake (2012, pp. 37–38) notes the contributions of Edward Adams, John Matheson, Mitt Regan,
and Charles Wolfram.
[31] To Knake (2012, p. 7), “It is not difficult to imagine other alternative law delivery models that might
be developed if a company like Google could take the next step to directly own or invest in a law prac-
tice, or if Wal-Mart could add a legal assistance window next to the banking center or health care
provider located in its stores.”
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